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Contract Law
CONTRACT

LAW-PAROL EVIDENCE RULE-UNDER PENNSYLVANIA

EVIDENCE

OF FRAUD Is

ADMISSIBLE

LAW

DESPITE THE PRESENCE

OF A MERGER CLAUSE

Betz Laboratories,Inc. v. Hines (1981)

Betz Laboratories, Inc. (Betz) contacted the trustees of the Cabot
Trust 1 and Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Co. 2 (Cabot) to purchase a commercial
building.8 Betz indicated the necessity of specific floor strength requirements 4 and Cabot represented that its building would meet those requirements. 5 The contract of sale made no reference to the condition
of the floor or to Betz's requirements; 6 however, it did include a standardized merger clause which provided: "This agreement contains the whole
agreement between the Seller and Buyer and there are no other terms,
obligations, covenants, representations, statements or conditions, oral or
otherwise, of any kind whatsoever." 7 Shortly after purchasing the
1. Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines, 647 F.2d 402, 403 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Cabot trust was a Massachusetts business trust created under a Pennsylvania trust declaration. Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendants
for Summary Judgment at 1, Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines, No. 79-3177
(E.D. Pa. July 30, 1980).
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendants for Summary Judgment at 1, Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines, No. 79-3177 (E.D. Pa. July 30,
1980). Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Co., a business created under Massachusetts
law, was the sole beneficiary of the Cabot 95 Trust. Id.
3. 647 F.2d at 403.
4. Id. Betz made clear its need for a five-inch concrete slab floor, reinforced with wire mesh, and capable of supporting at least 750 pounds per
square foot. Id.
5. To assure Betz of the floor's strength, Cabot gave Betz the plans and
specifications used in the construction of the building and hired a consulting
engineer to determine the floor's loading capacity. Id. On the basis of two
test borings at opposite ends of the four acre floor, the engineer found that
the "floor was four (4) inches thick and reinforced with wire mesh" and concluded that it could support one thousand pounds per square foot. Id. He
noted, however, that the test borings may not be representative of the actual
construction and that in time there might be cracking due to support soil
adjustments. Id. These findings, which were sent to Betz, were interpreted
by Cabot as adequately meeting Betz's requirements. Id. One of Cabot's
representatives stated that the soil was well compacted and that the average
depth of the floor was at least five inches. Id.
6. Id.

The contract of sale was drafted by Betz's attorneys.

Id.

7. Id.

(654)
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building, Betz discovered that the floor was not strong enough to meet
its needs 8 and incurred expenses of $82,000 in strengthening the floor. 9
Betz brought an action against Cabot to recover its expenses, 1° alleging breach of contract 11 and fraud in the inducement of the contract. 12 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment 13
on the grounds that: 1) the contract was not breached as it did not encompass the oral representations; 14 and 2) an action for fraud could not
be maintained since, inter alia,15 the merger clause constituted an effective disclaimer and precluded justifiable reliance on Cabot's statements. 16
8. Id.

Betz discovered a number of defects: portions of the concrete

floor were only two and one-half inches thick; the wire mesh used for reinforcement was underneath rather than embedded in the concrete in several
places; and there were sizeable gaps between the floor and the soil. Id.
9. Id. In order to strengthen the floor, Betz had to pump grouting under
the concrete slab. Id.
10. Id. The plaintiff filed the case in the Court of Common Pleas of
Bucks County, Pennsylvania, but the defendant removed the action to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, basing
jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
11. 647 F.2d at 403.
12. Id.
13. Id. The defendants made two arguments in support of the motion
for summary judgment: that the parol evidence rule precluded the court
from construing the oral representations as collateral to the written agreement;
and, that the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule is inoperative when
the plaintiff has waived his right to rely on representations by signing a contract containing a merger clause. Memorandum in Support of Motion of
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines,
No. 79-3177 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1980).
14. Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines, No. 79-3177, slip op. at 12-13 (E.D.
Pa. July 30, 1980). The district court found that because the oral representations were not collateral to the agreement, they were within the scope
of the parol evidence rule and were thus inadmissible. Id.
15. Id.

The court also concluded that the representations were not

assertions of existing fact, but statements of opinion.

Id.

16. Id. slip op. at 24. The district court noted the conflicts in Pennsylvania decisional law regarding what a plaintiff must plead in order to bring
the facts alleged within the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule. Id.
slip op. at 14-16. It found, however, that it was unnecessary to resolve the
ambiguities of Pennsylvania law because the alleged statements regarding
floor strength could not, as a matter of law, be characterized as misrepresentations, and the plaintiff waived his right to rely on the defendants' representations when he signed a contract with a merger clause and with no
reference to floor strength. Id. slip op. at 21-23. In concluding that there
could be no justifiable reliance as a matter of law, the court also noted the
fact that the contract was written by plaintiff's counsel. Id. slip op. at 21.
Finally, with regard to the applicability of the parol evidence rule to a claim
for fraud, the court stated "that if the parol evidence rule precludes an
action for breach of warranty, or breach of contract, it equally protects against
an action for fraud, or fraudulent misrepresentations." Id. slip op. at 24.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 17 reversed
and remanded,' 8 holding that under Pennsylvania law, evidence of fraud
in the inducement of a contract falls outside the parol evidence rule and
hence, is admissible evidence. Betz Laboratories, Inc. v. Hines, 647 F.2d
402 (3rd Cir. 1981).
The parol evidence rule 19 was adopted by the Supreme Court of
17. The case as heard by Circuit Judges Weis and Higginbotham, and
Judge Barron P. McCune, United States District Court Judge for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Judge Weis delivered the
opinion for a unanimous panel.
18. The Third Circuit found that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment since its order was based on the premise that Betz would
not be allowed to introduce evidence of fraud. 647 F.2d at 408. Betz did
not appeal from the district court's order of dismissal as to the first count
alledging breach of contract. Id.
19. The parol evidence rule, a rule of substantive contract law, has been
defined by Professor Corbin as follows:
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a
writing to which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and negotiations will not be
admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.
3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 573, at 357 (1960). See also 4 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 631, at 949 (3d ed. 1961); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS §213 (1981); U.C.C. §2-202 (1978 version).
The major issue
raised by the rule is whether an integrated agreement has been formed. J.
CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW

OF

CONTRACTS 103 (1977).

The rule is of

no aid in making this determination, however, because it applies only when
an agreement exists which has already been acknowledged by the parties to
be a complete and integrated one. See id. at 99.
While both Professor Corbin and Professor Williston agree that the
intent of the parties is determinative of whether an agreement is integrated,
they differ on how to discover the parties' intent. Id. at 103-07. For further
discussion of their differences, see note 22 infra. According to both scholars,
one factor that aids in the determination of whether an agreement is integrated is the existence of a merger clause. See 3 A. CORBIN, supra, § 578,
at 403; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra. § 633, at 1014. A merger clause is "a provision
in a contract to the effect that the written terms may not be varied by prior
or oral agreements because all such agreements have been merged into the
written contract." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 892 (5th ed. 1979). Such a
clause, though usually conclusive evidence of the parties' intent that a complete agreement exists, is not conclusive when the contract is set aside by
the court on the grounds of fraud or mistake. 3 CORuBIN, supra § 578, at 403.
Another context in which the parol evidence rule applies is in the interpretation of contracts. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra, at 24-26. The
Restatement view is that the parol evidence rule does not bar the introduction
of extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning of an integrated writing. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214 comment b (1981).
For discussions of the parol evidence rule, see generally Calamari and
Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule, 42 IND. L.J. 333 (1967);
Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161 (1965); Farnsworth, Meaning in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE
L.J. 939 (1967); Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4 DUQ.
L. REV. 337 (1966); Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standardized
Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1342 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Murray, Agreements Under the Restate-
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Pennsylvania 20 in the 1924 case of Gianni v. R. Russell & Co. 2 1 In
Gianni, the supreme court stated that when a writing appears on its face
to contain the complete agreement between the parties, parol evidence is
inadmissible in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake.2 2 Where
ment]; Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 833 (1964).
20. See generally Note, A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule in Pennsylvania, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 703 (1952) [hereinafter cited as A Critique of the
Parol Evidence Rule]. The commentator criticized the Pennsylvania courts'
interpretation of the parol evidence rule both for its failure to take into
account the contracting parties' actual intent, and for its proposition that
the question of whether a contract is complete or integrated is to be determined by the court. Id. at 718-26. See also Note, A Decade of Gianni v.
Russell Co.-The Modern Pennsylvania Parol Evidence Rule, 83 U. PA. L.
REv. 500 (1935) [hereinafter cited as A Decade of Gianni]. This commentator chronicled a number of cases preceding and following Gianni to show that
the pre-Gianni cases were "at least inferentially overruled" by post-Gianni
cases. Id. at 503.
In Gianni, the court was con21. 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924).
fronted with the issue of whether to admit evidence of a landlord's promise
which was claimed to have induced a prospective tenant to sign a contract.
Id. at 322-23, 126 A. at 791. The landlord allegedly promised the prospective
tenant that he would have exclusive rights to sell soft drinks in the landlord's
building. Id. When the landlord rented a room to a drugstore without restricting its right to sell soda, the original tenant sued for breach of the
alleged oral agreement. Id.
22. Id. at 323, 126 A. at 792. The court stated:
[I]f it appears to be a contract complete within itself "couched in
such terms as import a complete legal obligation without any uncertainty as to the object or extent of the engagement, it is conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and
the extent and manner of their undertaking, were reduced to
writing."
Id., quoting Seitz v. Brewers' Refrigerating Mach. Co., 141 U.S. 510, 517 (1891).
The Gianni court also stated that the determination of whether the
parties intended the agreement to constitute their entire contract is to be
made by the court. 281 Pa. at 325, 126 A. at 792. Applying the rule it had
formulated, the Gianni court held that the landlord's oral promise to the
tenant that he would have exclusive rights to sell soft drinks in the defendant's
building was admissible in the plaintiff's suit for breach of contract. Id. at
320, 126 A. at 791.
Of the two major approaches to the question of what constitutes a total
integration-Professor Williston's and Professor Corbin's-the Gianni court's
approach has been viewed as similar to that of Professor Williston. See J.
CALIMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 19, at 106-07. Simply stated, Professor
Corbin's view is that the determination of the parties' intent as to whether
an agreement is complete should be made with reference to evidence outside
the agreement itself, while Professor Williston's view is that the determination of the parties' intent must be made by looking only at the writing. Id.
at 104-06, citing 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 581 (1963); 1 S. WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 633 (3d. ed. 1957).

Professor Corbin's view is

reflected in the Second Restatement of Contracts.

J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO,

supra note 19, at 109, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §240(b)

comment a; § 236 comments a and b (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1973). For a discussion of the Restatement's approach to the problem of determining the
parties' intent to form an integrated agreement, see Murray, Agreements
under the Restatement, supra note 19. The tendency of courts today is
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fraud, 23 accident, or mistake is alleged, the court must ascertain whether
the oral agreement merged with a writing that was complete on its
face. 24 According to the Gianni court, a comparison must be made betoward adoption of the more liberal or Corbin view. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 19, at I11, citing 3 A. CORBIN. §§ 573-595 (1963); Battery
Steamship Corp. v. Retinaria Panama, 513 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1975); Aboussie v.
Aboussie, 441 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Clementon Sewerage
Auth., 365 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1960); Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 436
P.2d 501, 65 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1968).
23. See 3 A. CORIN, supra note 19, § 578, at 403; 4 S. WILLISTON, supra
note 19, § 631, at 949.
Fraud was originally given a broad definition in Pennsylvania. See A
Decade of Gianni, supra note 20, at 501. See also Harrison, Pennsylvania
Rule as to Admissibility of Evidence to Establish Contemporaneous Inducing
Promises 'to Affect Written Instruments, 74 U. PA. L. REv. 235 (1925); Note,
The Admissibility of Evidence to Establish Oral Contemporaneous Inducing
Promises to Affect Written Instruments in Pennsylvania, 52 AM. L. REG.
601 (1904).
One commentator traced two lines of cases dealing with fraud: 1) those
in which "all contemporaneous inducing promises were admissible," and 2) a
more narrow line in which promises were admissible where there was a
"fraudulent use of the instrument in violation of the promise or agreement
made contemporaneously with the execution of the writing and without which
it would not have been signed." See A Decade of Gianni, supra note 20, at
501. The author identified the first line of cases as "the broader line" and
noted that the first case in this line was the unreported case of Hurst's Lessee
v. Kirkbride, reported in Wallace v. Baker, 1 Binn. 610, 616 (Pa. 1809). Id.
In a later case which cited Hurst's Lessee v. Kirkbride and which is also
representative of the broader viewpoint, the court permitted the plaintiff
to introduce evidence of a parol agreement that the defendant would level
his land, even though it was made contemporaneously with a written deed
of release for the right of way over plaintiff's land. See Croyle v. Cambria
Land & Improvement Co., 233 Pa. 310, 82 A. 360 (1912). The court implicitly characterized the defendant's action in breaking his promise as fraud
when it quoted the following language from an earlier case:
All the cases show that to pave the way for the receiving of oral
declarations it is not necessary to prove a party was actuated by a
fraudulent intent at the time of the execution of the writing. His
original object may have been perfectly honest and upright; but if to
procure an unfair advantage to himself he subsequently denies the
parol qualification of the written contract, it is such a fraud, as will
under the rules operate to let in evidence of the real intent and
final conclusion of the contractors.
Id. at 315, 82 A. at 362, quoting Renshaw v. Gans, 7 Pa. 117 (1847). This type
of fraud has come to be known as promissory fraud. For a full discussion
of whether evidence of such fraud should be admissible, see Sweet, Promisory
Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL. L. REv. 877 (1961). For an
example of the narrower line of cases, see Phillips Gas 8 Oil Co. v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 213 Pa. 183, 62 A. 830 (1906). In Phillips, the court permitted the defendant lessor to introduce evidence of a contemporaneous
parol agreement in which the plaintiff lessee agreed that he would not claim
title to the land nor use it to drill gas wells. Id. The court found that
the plaintiff's claim to title of the land and his use of it for purposes of gas
drilling were fraudulent and in violation of the parol agreement. Id. at 188,
62 A. at 832. Gianni v. Russell & Co. implicitly overruled both lines of
cases. See A Decade of Gianni, supra note 20, at 503-05.
24. 281 Pa. at 323-24, 126 A. at 792. For a discussion of this determination, see A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 704.
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tween the evidence sought to be introduced and the written agreement
to determine whether the parties would "naturally and normally" have
included the former in the latter had they thought about it.25 If the
agreement and the parol evidence relate to the same subject, 26 then, the
court stated, the "scope of the subsidiary agreement must be taken to be
covered by the writing," and the evidence sought to be introduced would
be deemed admissible. 27 Pennsylvania cases dealing with the parol evidence rule continue to cite Gianni28 and its principles as controlling.2 9
25. 281 Pa. at 323-24, 126 A. at 792. See A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 706 n.13. While identifying this as the "second
test," this commentator noted that the determination of whether the parties
would have "naturally and normally" included the parol statement in the
final writing could also be viewed as merely a factor in determining whether
an instrument is complete on its face. Id.
26. 281 Pa. at 324, 126 A. at 792. Professor Murray, in his interpretation
of Gianni, regarded this as a separate test and not simply a method of determining what the parties might "naturally and normally" have included.
See Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, supra note 19, at 340.
Other commentators, however, view the determination of whether the parol
statement and the final writing relate to the same subject as a means of
deceiding whether the parties would have included one in the other. See
A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 706-07.
27. 281 Pa. at 324, 126 A. at 792. According to the Gianni court, the
purpose of the parol evidence rule, the preservation of integrity in written
contracts was thereby served. Id. at 325, 126 A. at 792. The court cited
several of its recent decisions as confirming this goal. Id., citing Walverine
Glass Co. v. Miller, 279 Pa. 138, 123 A. 672 (1924); Evans v. Edelstein, 276
Pa. 516, 120 A. 473 (1923); Neville v. Kretzschmar, 271 Pa. 222, 114 A. 625
(1921). More recently the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the purpose of the parol evidence rule as the preservation of integrity in written
agreements. See Rose v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 437 Pa. 117, 120-21, 262
A.2d 851, 853 (1970) (holding that parol evidence precluded proof of oral
promise to register securities or render them transferable). In addition to
facilitating contractual relations, the parol evidence rule also serves the more
immediate purpose of insuring that judgments will not be tainted by unsophisticated jury treatment of two different kinds of evidence. Murray,
The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, supra note 19, at 338-39.
28. See A Critique of the Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 20, at 706;
Crompton-Richmond Co.-Factors v. Smith, 253 F. Supp. 980, 983 (E.D. Pa.
1966), af'd, 392 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1967) (the parol evidence rule, as set forth
by Gianni, precluded admission of an oral statement concerning the effective
date of a written guarantee where the written guarantee made no mention
of any belated effectiveness); La Course v. Kiesel, 366 Pa. 385, 390, 77 A. 2d
877, 880 (evidence of representations would be inadmissible to contradict the
written agreement of sale which the plaintiffs signed). Some courts summarize the parol evidence rule by stating that evidence which varies or contradicts the writing may not be introduced. See, e.g., United States v. 29.16
Acres, More or Less, Valley Forge National Historical Park, 496 F. Supp. 924
(E.D. Pa., 1980). It should be noted that this is not a method for determining whether the agreement is complete, but rather the analysis which follows
this determination. See L. SIMPsoN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
(2d ed. 1965).
29. See note 28 supra.
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Since the Gianni decision, Pennsylvania courts have refined the
boundaries of the "fraud exception" 30 to the parol evidence rule by
distinguishing between fraud in the inducement (where one party induces
another to enter into a contract by means of false statements) and fraud
in the execution (where one party deceives another about the contents
of an agreement). 8 Generally, evidence of fraud in the execution of a
contract was deemed admissible, whereas evidence of fraud in the inducement of it was not.3 2 In the 1931 case of Feuerstein v. New Century
Realty,33 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disapproved of this distinction in the absence of a merger clause, and held that evidence of the
defendant's misrepresentation of his assets made to induce the plaintiff
to enter into a contract was admissible.8 4 The distinction between the
30. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 19, § 634 at 1017; A. CORBIN, supra
note 19, § 580 at 431. These scholars regard the term "fraud exception"
as a misnomer, since fraud, rather than constituting an exception to the
rule, presents a situation where the rule does not apply. Id. It is reasoned
that parol evidence is always admissible to show that a contract does not
exist and therefore, it may be introduced to show that fraud has impaired a
contract's validity. Id.
31. See Humphrey v. Brown, 291 Pa. 53, 139 A. 606 (1927) (implicitly
distinguishing between the two types of fraud in holding, inter alia, that the
defendant seller's defense to a suit for specific performance of land was without merit, absent an allegation that the parties' understanding that the seller
had a right to withdraw from the contract at any time had been omitted
through fraud, accident, or mistake). For an explanation of the difference
between these two kinds of fraud, see Sweet, supra note 23, at 894.
32. Humphrey v. Brown, 291 Pa. 53, 139 A. 606 (1927).
33. 304 Pa. 271, 156 A. 110 (1931).
In the sale of a brewery to the
plaintiff, the defendant represented that he had 4,700 barrels of beer when
in fact he had 5,000 empty barrels. Id. Furthermore, the defendant stated
that his $275,000 mortgage on the property was extended for three years,
when it was in fact due. Id.
34. Id. at 275, 156 A. at 111. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did
not expressly reject the distinction between fraud in the inducement and
fraud in the execution. Id. Furthermore, since the distinction was maintained in cases decided after Feuerstein, the holding could be construed as
limited to the particular facts before the Feuerstein court. See Kull v. General Motors Truck Co., 311 Pa. 580, 166 A. 562 (1933) (implicitly distinguishing the two types of fraud through the statement that absent an averment
that parol warranties were fraudulently omitted from the contract of sale,
evidence of defendant salesman's misrepresentations concerning the age of a
car made to induce the plaintiff to enter into the contract could not be introduced); Silberman v. Crane, 158 Pa. Super. Ct. 186, 44 A.2d 598 (1945)
(the defendant could not introduce evidence that the plaintiff fraudulently
induced him to sign an order form for advertising space through the alleged
misrepresentation that the order form would be cancelled upon certain conditions, in the absence of an averment that the plaintiff fraudulently omitted
something from the agreement).
This distinction between the two kinds of fraud as a basis for determining the admissibility of evidence has been rejected in many other states
without regard to the presence of a merger clause. Comment, The Merger
Clause and the Parol Evidence Rule, 27 TEX. L. REv. 361, 366-70. See also
Lufty v. R. D. Roper & Sons Motor Co., 57 Ariz. 495, 506-07, 115 P. 2d 161,
166 (1941) (permitting the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the defendant
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two kinds of fraud was further eroded by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's decision in La Course v. Kiesal.35 There, the court concluded
that evidence of fraud in the inducement was admissible notwithstanding
the presence of a merger clause.3 6 The court noted that the parol evidence rule was not violated because the representation did not "contradict, vary or add to the terms of the agreement." 37
Two years later, in Bardwell v. Willis,38 the importance of distinguishing between the two types of fraud was reaffirmed with the supreme
court's holding that certain fraudulent statements, made to induce a
party to enter into a lease, were inadmissible.89 After a thorough analysis of certain clauses in the lease, 40 the court concluded that to allow the
had falsely represented a car as a newer model to induce the plaintiff to
agree to purchase it); Bates v. Southgate, 308 Mass. 170, 31 N.E.2d 551, 55859 (1941) (evidence of fraudulent statements inducing an investment broker
to enter into a contract for the purchase of stock from a brokerage firm was
admissible despite the existence of a merger clause); Gloeser v. Moore, 283
Mich. 425, 430, 278 N.W. 72, 74 (1938) (despite a merger clause, the court
permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence that the defendant had induced
him to enter into the agreement for the purchase of defendant's company
by falsely representing that the company had already paid out dividends).
35. 366 Pa. 385, 77 A.2d 877 (1951). In La Course, the plaintiff buyer
alleged that the defendant, an owner of a building, misrepresented the marketability of title by stating that the title was marketable in the agreement of
sale. Id. at 588-89, 77 A.2d at 878-79. In addition, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant stated that the building was "splendid for apartments" in
a circular describing the property. Id. The contract of sale contained a
merger clause. Id. at 391, 77 A.2d at 881. After purchasing the building,
the plaintiffs found that certain restrictions prohibited the conversion of
the building into an apartment house. Id. at 388, 77 A.2d at 879.
36. Id. at 391, 77 A.2d at 881.
37. Id. The court stated: "The so-called integration clause does not by
its terms preclude proof of the misrepresentation here complained of because
such representation does not 'contradict, vary or add to the terms of the
agreement.' The evidence thereof was admissible to justify the rescission." Id.
38. 375 Pa. 503, 100 A.2d 102 (1953). The plaintiff lessees averred
that the defendants' agents fraudulently represented to plaintiffs that the
leased premises would meet the plaintiff's water, drainage, electrical, and
heating needs, and that the plaintiffs entered into a five-year lease with the
defendant in reliance upon these representations. Id. at 505, 100 A.2d at 103.
39. Id. at 507, 100 A.2d at 104. This dictinction was implicit in the
court's observation that the plaintiffs would have had a cause of action had
they averred that representations concerning the premises were fraudulently
omitted from the lease. Id.
40. Id. at 505, 100 A.2d at 104-05. In undertaking a factual inquiry
similar to the court's analysis in La Course, the Bardwell court highlighted
two clauses in the lease. Id. One clause stated that the lessees "examined and
are familiar with the condition of the premises and buildings thereon, and
that the same are received in good order and condition without warranty as
to the condition or repair thereof by the first party for their intended use."
The other clause provided: "[t]his lease agreement contains the entire contract
and agreement between 'the parties." Id. at 506, 100 A.2d at 104 (emphasis
supplied by the court).
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introduction of parol evidence would be improper because the evidence
41
sought to be admitted clearly contradicted the lease agreement.
The next case involving the issue of whether evidence of fraud in
the inducement is barred by the parol evidence rule when there exists
an integrated agreement was Berger v. Pittsburgh Auto Equipment Co.42
In Berger,43 the court began its analysis of the admissibility of oral assurances concerning the floor strength of leased premises by examining
the scope of a clause which stated that the tenant had inspected the
premises and accepted them as they were. 44 Emphasizing the language
of this clause and the fact that the floor's inadequate support would not
have been apparent from the tenant's inspection, 45 the court concluded
that the tenant was not precluded from introducing the alleged misrepresentation as to the floor's strength. 46 However, the court expressly
limited its holding to the facts, noting that the parties' written agree41. Id. at 506, 100
that the parol evidence
tion of the defendants'
following query of the

A.2d at 105. While the court did not expressly state
rule would have been violated through the introducmisrepresentation, this conclusion is implicit in the

court: "What is the use of inserting such clauses in

agreements if one of the parties thereto is permitted to prove by oral testimony that he didn't examine and wasn't familiar with the premises or their
condition, or that they would not meet the standards which plaintiffs require?" Id.
Since the court concluded that the parol evidence rule was applicable
to evidence of fraudulent statements inducing the plaintiff to enter into a contract, the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' cause of
action. Id.
42. 387 Pa. 61, 127 A.2d 334 (1956).
43. Id. at 63, 127 A.2d at 335. In an appeal of a judgment against a
tenant for failure to pay the remainder of the rent, the tenant argued that
he was induced to enter into the lease by the landlord's alleged misrepresentation that the floor of the demised premises could withstand the weight of
the automobile equipment that the tenant planned to store there. Id. After
occupying the building for almost three years, the tenant found that the floor
was not even strong enough to support the minimum weight required by
the Building Code of the City of Pittsburgh. Id. at 63-64, 127 A.2d at 335.
Because of insufficient floor strength, the tenant was unable to obtain a certificate of occupancy. Id. at 64, 127 A.2d at 335. After the landlord refused
to strengthen the floor so as to enable the tenant to obtain a certificate, the
tenant abandoned the building and refused to pay rent, whereupon the landlord entered a judgment of confession against the tenant for the balance of
the rent. Id. at 63, 127 A.2d at 335.
44. Id. at 64-66, 127 A.2d at 335-36. The written clause, which was con-

tained in a collateral agreement, provided that "[t]he tenant has inspected
the premises and accepts the property in its present condition." Id. at 65,
127 A.2d at 336.
45. Id.
46. Id. The court also held that, notwithstanding the fact that the tenant

had occupied the property for almost three years, the tenant was not estopped

from using the landlord's alleged fraud to justify his removal in light of the
fact that he was not aware of the floor's inadequacy during his occupancy.
Id. at 66-67, 127 A.2d at 336-37.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 9

1981-82]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

ment would have barred the admission of the alleged fraudulent state47
ment if the defect had been readily ascertainable.
47. Id. at 66, 127 A.2d at 336, citing Abrams, Inc. v. Wolkov, 371 Pa.
44, 89 A.2d 359 (1952) (holding inadmissible seller's advertisement that
each apartment contained two bathrooms, when it was readily apparent that
each apartment had only one, and the parties' written lease included a merger
clause).
Justice Bell, in a lengthy dissenting opinion, would have reached a different result on several grounds. 387 Pa. at 67, 127 A.2d at 337 (Bell, J., dissenting). First, noting the relation between the subject matter of the representation sought to be introduced and the written agreement, he claimed
that under the parol evidence rule the evidence should be inadmissible. Id.
at 69-72, 127 A.2d at 337-39 (Bell, J., dissenting). Secondly, he found that
the misrepresentation regarding floor strength did not amount to a representation of existing fact. Id. at 80, 127 A.2d at 342 (Bell, J., dissenting).
The Berger rationale was followed in two subsequent cases which also
involved merger clauses and unascertainable defects. See Highmont Music
Corp. v. J. M. Hoffmann Co., 397 Pa. 345, 155 A.2d 363 (1959); National
Bldg. Leasing, Inc. v. Byler, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 381 A.2d 963 (1977). In
Highmont Music, an action for fraud, a tenant sought to introduce misrepresentations by the landlord as to floor strength, despite the presence of a
clause which read as follows:
'Tenant agrees to accept the premises in their present condition and
make all necessary repairs, improvements and alterations at their own
expense' and that tenant leases the premises 'in its present condition
and to make all necessary repairs, improvements or alterations at
their own cost and expense to the interior of the premises.'
397 Pa. at 348, 350 155 A.2d at 364-65. Following the reasoning of the
Berger court, the court concluded that because inadequate floor strength was
not a readily apparent defect, and because the language of the clause precluded the introduction of only obvious defects, the evidence of fraudulent
statements was admissible. Id. at 352, 155 A.2d at 367. In holding that the
misrepresentations were admissible, the court noted that, given this particular
merger clause, the result would have been different had the defect been
reasonably ascertainable. Id., citing Berger v. Pittsburgh Auto Equip. Co., 382
Pa. 61, 127 A.2d 334, 336.
In National Building, also a fraud action, purchasers of real property
sought to introduce evidence of the seller's misrepresentations regarding the
property and concealment of debris-filled holes. 252 Pa. Super. Ct. at 372,
381 A.2d at 965. The written contract of sale between the parties contained
the following integration clause:
It is understood that Buyer has inspected the property or hereby
waives the right to do so and he has agreed to purchase it as a result
of such inspection and not because of or in reliance upon any
representation made by the Seller, or by the agent of the Seller or
any of the latter's salesmen and employees . . . and that he has
agreed to purchase it in its present condition unless otherwise specified herein. It is further understood that this agreement contains
the whole agreement between the Seller and the Buyer and there
are no other terms, obligations, covenants, representations, statements or conditions, oral or otherwise of any kind whatsoever concerning this sale. Furthermore, this agreement shall not be altered.
amended, changed or modified except in writing executed by the
parties hereto.
Id. at 373, 381 A.2d at 965. The court, like the supreme court in La Course,
also sought to enunciate a standard rule regarding the admissibility of evidence of fraud in the inducement, and in so doing, found Berger and Bardwell irreconcilable. Id. at 376, 381 A.2d at 966. Choosing to follow Berger,
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Recently, in LeDonne v. Kessler 48 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed its earlier pronouncement that Bardwell and Berger were
irreconcilable, 49 and suggested that the contradictory propositions of
those decisions as to the admissibility of evidence of fraud in the inducement were logical in the particular factual contexts of the cases. 50 Recognizing the futility of applying a single rule to all cases, the LeDonne
court devised a balancing test which incorporated the disparate policy
considerations that led to the outcomes in Bardwell and Berger.51 Under
this balancing test, the extent of the knowledge of defects ascertainable
from a reasonable inspection is weighed against the scope of the integration clause to determine if the parol evidence should be admitted. 2
The LeDonne court concluded that there could be no justifiable reliance
on statements concerning a readily apparent defect in the face of a com53
prehensive merger clause.
the court determined that the plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce
evidence of fraud, and reversed and remanded the case so the lower court
could decide the issue of justifiable reliance. Id.
48. 256 Pa. Super. Ct. 280, 389 A.2d 1123 (1978). In an action for fraud
the buyers of a house sought to introduce evidence of the seller's misrepresentations regarding drainage problems in the septic system and water leakage
problems on the sundeck and in the cellar. Id. at 283, 389 A.2d at 1025.
The agreement of sale contained the following provision: "'The parties have
full knowledge of the physical appearance of the land and buildings and of
the value thereof and there are no verbal representations as to quality or
character.'" Id. at 291, 389 A.2d at 1129 (emphasis supplied by court).
49. Id. at 289 n.5, 389 A.2d at 1128 n.5, citing National Bldg. Leasing,
Inc. v. Byler, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 381 A.2d 963 (1977). For a discussion
of National Building, see note 47 supra.
50. 256 Pa. Super. Ct. at 288-90 and nn.5 & 10, 389 A.2d at 1127-28 and
nn.5 8c 10. The superior court reconciled the two cases by observing that
the Bardwell requirement of alleging fraud in the execution was logical in
light of the explicit denial of all representations in the lease. Id. In contrast, the Berger court's decision to admit statements made prior to the agreement was based on the fact that the misrepresentations concerned defects
which did not fall into the category of "reasonably ascertainable conditions"
covered by the parties' writing. Id. at 289, 389 A.2d at 1128.
51. Id. at 293-94, 389 A.2d at 1130.
52. Id. at 294, 389 A.2d at 1130. The court summarized this balancing
test as follows:
Rather than rigidly apply the principle of Byler [that evidence of
fraudulent inducement is not barred by the parol evidence rule]
. . . we should balance the extent of the parties knowledge of objectionable conditions derived from a reasonable inspection against the
extent of the contract's coverage of the contract's integration clause
in order to determine whether that party could justifiably rely
upon oral representations without insisting upon further contractual
protection or deletion of an overly broad integration clause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
53. Id. The superior court held that while the buyers could justifiably
rely on the seller's statements regarding the septic system, which involved
hidden defects, they could not, as a matter of law, justifiably rely on the
seller's statements concerning water leakage, a condition which was apparent
upon a reasonable inspection. Id. at 292-97, 389 A.2d at 1130-32. The court
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Against the background of these decisions concerning the "fraud
exception" to the parol evidence rule in Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit
addressed the issue of fraudulent inducement in Betz Laboratories,Inc.
v. Hines.54 After summarily dismissing the district court's finding that
Cabot's interpretation of the engineer's report did not constitute a misreversed and remanded for a jury trial as to the alleged fraudulent statements
regarding the septic system. Id. at 296.
In support of its statement that there can be no justifiable reliance on
representations by the other party to a contract where there is a merger
clause and readily apparent defects, the court relied on an early superior
court case. See id. at 295, 389 A.2d at 1131, citing Lloyd & Elliott, Inc. v.
Lang, 118 Pa. Super. Ct. 190, 180 A. 74 (1935). In Lloyd, the parties' contract included a clause which stated that neither party would be responsible
for representations outside the language of the contract. 118 Pa. Super Ct.
at 191, 180 A. at 75. The Lloyd court held that an entry of summary judgment was proper for the party seeking to preclude the admission of fraudulent
representations, when the fraud was in the inducement of the contract,
rather than in its execution. Id. at 195, 180 A. at 77.
The LeDonne approach was followed in another superior court case.
See Glanski v. Ervine, 269 Pa. Super. Ct. 182, 409 A.2d 425 (1979). In
Glanski, Judge Spaeth chronicled the cases leading up to LeDonne, and concluded that the LeDonne rule reconciled Berger and Bardwell. Id. at 189-91,
409 A.2d at 428-30. The evidence sought to be introduced in Glanski was
a statement by a real estate broker that a house was termite-free. Id. at 183.
409 A.2d at 427. Upon finding that the "as is" clause alerted the house
buyer to defects, but did not preclude his reliance on the broker's representations, and that termite damage was not reasonably apparent, the court held
that the broker's assurances were admissible. Id. at 190-91 and n.4, 409 A.2d
at 429-30 and n.4.
The scope of the integration clause, one of the two factors in the Le Donne
balancing test, was the controlling consideration in a much-criticized New York
case. See Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184
N.Y.S.2d 599 (1959). In Danann, the New York Court of Appeals held, as a
matter of law, that the particular integration clause, which included a statement that neither party was relying upon the other's representations, precluded
plaintiff's justifiable reliance on defendants' misrepresentations as to the operating expenses and profits to be derived from the building which plaintiff
purchased from defendants. 5 N.Y.2d at 320-23, 157 N.E.2d at 598-600, 184
N.Y.S.2d at 603-04. Without justifiable reliance, the court concluded, there
could be no fraud, and hence no cause of action. Id. The court suggested
that the plaintiff himself was guilty of fraud in contractually stating that he
was not relying on any representations, and then claiming in his lawsuit that
he had relied on statements made by the defendants. Id. at 323, 157 N.E.2d
at 600, 184 N.Y.S.2d at 604. In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Fuld
observed that a plaintiff's cause of action should not be made to depend on
the language of the contract. Id. at 326, 157 N.E.2d at 602, 184 N.Y.S.2d at
604 (Fuld, J., dissenting). For discussions of Danann, see generally Gilbride,
The Merger Clause and the Danann Case, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 269, 271-72
(1961) (claiming that on balance, the advantages of "limiting liability in advance, are far outweighed by the dangers inherent in the possibility of denying
a defrauded party his day in court"); Comment, Disclaimer of Liability for
Fraud in Written Agreements, 24 ALB. L. REV. 148 (1960) (suggesting that even
though the plaintiff should have his day in court, the presence of a specific
merger clause should be evidence of no reliance); Note, Specific Disclaimer of
Fraud Which Induced Contract, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 223, 227 (1960) (noting
that the "sanctity-of-contract" rationale espoused by Danann was not intended
to protect one who commits fraud).
54. 647 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1981).
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representation of "existing fact," 55 the Third Circuit devoted the remainder of its opinion to the appellant's argument that fraud in the
56
inducement may be proven notwithstanding the parol evidence rule.
Initially, Judge Weis chronicled the major Pennsylvania decisions in
this area. 57 In its discussion of Feuerstein58 and La Course 59 the court
noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had approved of the introduction of parol evidence regarding fraud in the inducement where such
evidence did not vary or contradict the terms of the agreement.6 0 Thus,
Judge Weis found that Bardwell 61 introduced uncertainty and confusion
with its holding that the parol evidence rule prohibited evidence of
fraudulent inducement.6 2 The Betz court further observed that subse3
quent cases, notably Berger,6 were in line with pre-Bardwell authority 64
55. Id. at 404-05. The Third Circuit noted that in the context of a
motion for summary judgment, the facts must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the opposing party. Id. at 404. The court reasoned that "when
the plaintiff's allegations are appraised in this fashion, the statements concededly made by defendants are factual, not merely opinion." Id. at 404-05,
citing Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffmann Co., 397 Pa. 345, 351, 155
A.2d 363, 366 (1959).
56. 647 F.2d at 405-08. The appellant also argued that the district court
erred in its finding that there was no misrepresentation as a matter of law
because there could be no justifiable reliance given the merger clause. Brief
for Appellant at 9, id. at 402. The Third Circuit found it unnecessary to
address this issue. Id. at 402-08.
57. Id. at 405-07.
58. Id. at 405. The Betz Court quoted with approval Feuerstein's explanation of why evidence of fraud in the inducement was always admissible:
that when such evidence was offered, it was offered not to contradict the writing,
but "'to strike the writing down, just as though it had never been in existence,
Id.,
or to strike down such part of it as is dependent on the fraud .... ."
quoting Feuerstein, 304 Pa. at 275-76, 156 A.2d at Ill. For a discussion of
Feuerstein, see notes 33 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
59. 647 F.2d at 405. Judge Weis observed that La Course ruled that evidence of fraud in the inducement was admissible despite the presence of an
integration clause because the representations did not contradict or vary the
terms of the agreement. Id., quoting La Course, 366 Pa. at 391, 77 A.2d at
881. For a discussion of La Course, see notes 35-37 and accompanying text
supra.
60. 647 F.2d at 405.
61. Id. at 405. For a discussion of Bardwell, see notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
62. 647 F.2d at 405. After summarizing the facts and holding in Bardwell,
the Betz court noted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's view that under any
other interpretation, the parol evidence rule would become a mockery. Id.
63. Id. at 405-06. In its summary of Berger's facts, the Third Circuit noted
that the plaintiff offered the evidence not to contradict the writing, but rather
to rescind it. Id. While the Third Circuit also observed that the Berger
court attempted to distinguish the facts before it from those in Bardwell, it
cited the dissent approvingly for its observation that Berger and Bardwell were
irreconcilable. Id. at 406. For a discussion of Berger, see notes 42-47 and
accompanying text supra.
64. 647 F.2d at 406. The Third Circuit cited three cases that followed
Berger and which, like Berger itself, were consistent with the pre-Bardwell
cases. Id. at 406, citing Nadolny v. Scoratow, 412 Pa. 488, 195 A.2d 87 (1963);
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and that the Bardwell and Berger rationales were "fundamentally inconsistent." 65
After its survey of the uncertain state of the parol evidence rule in
Pennsylvania, 66 the Betz court noted that it was arguably incorrect to
characterize fraud as an "exception" to the parol evidence rule. 67 Under
the Third Circuit's interpretation, the parol evidence rule should be inapplicable when fraud is alleged, since "the fraud establishes that there
is no contract." 68 Thus, the court reasoned that it was unnecessary to
establish any relationship between the wording of the integration clause
and evidence of fraud in the inducement. 69 Based on this reasoning, the
Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffmann Co., 397 Pa. 345,

155 A.2d 363

(1959); National Bldg. Leasing, Inc. v. Byler, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 381 A.2d

963 (1977). While stating that Highmont was consistent with Berger, the Third
Circuit also observed that the Highmont court gave the plaintiff the option of

seeking either damages for fraud or rescinding the contract. 647 F.2d at 406,
citing Highmont Music Corp. v. J.M. Hoffmann Co., 397 Pa. 345, 155 A.2d

363 (1959). The court then noted that Nadolny v. Scoratow, in which evidence
of misrepresentations made by the landlord to the tenant regarding floor
strength were properly admissible, followed Highmont. 647 F.2d at 406, citing
Nadolny v. Scoratow, 412 Pa. 488, 195 A.2d 87 (1963). judge Weis further
observed that while the court in National Building found Bardwell "troublesome," it nonetheless rejected the proposition that fraud in the inducement was
inadmissible. 647 F.2d at 406, citing National Bldg. Leasing, Inc. v. Byler,
252 Pa. Super. Ct. 370, 381 A.2d 963 (1977).
The court also noted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court returned to
"Bardwell's restrictive holding" in Nicolella v. Palmer. 647 F.2d at 406,
citing Nicolella v. Palmer, 432 Pa. 502, 507-08, 248 A.2d 20, 22-23 (1968)
(holding inadmissible the defendant's statements that there had been no

changes in building specifications that would materially affect a contract bid
because plaintiff did not aver that these statements were fraudulently omitted
from the contract, but only that they were made to induce plaintiff to sign
the contract).

65. 647 F.2d at 406. The Third Circuit rejected the position taken by
the Pennsylvania Superior Court in LeDonne v. Kessler, that Berger, Bardwell, and National Building could be harmonized on the basis of the subject
of the misrepresentation and the language of the integration clause. Id.
For a discussion of LeDonne, see notes 48-52 and accompanying text supra.
Since Judge Weis viewed the Bardwell and Berger rationales as inconsistent,
he concluded that an attempt to reconcile the two cases would be unsound.
647 F.2d at 406.
66. 647 F.2d at 406. Judge Weis stressed that the Third Circuit's role
was not to formulate law, but only "to predict what the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania would do if presented with the issue." Id., citing Keystone
Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrome Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 147 (3d Cir. 1974).
67. 647 F.2d at 406. The court applied the Feuerstein observation that
fraud renders an agreement voidable to conclude that fraud also renders an
integration clause voidable. Id., citing J. MuRRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRAncrs
§ 106 (2d rev. ed. 1974).
68. 647 F.2d at 406.
69. Id. The court emphasized that an action for rescission or damages
based on fraud must be distinguished from a situation where inaccurate representations not amounting to fraud are sought to be introduced in an action
for breach of contract. Id. at 406-07. According to the Third Circuit, in
the latter setting, "the language of the 'integration clause' would be an aid in
determining whether all the facets of the transaction have been incorporated
in the writing." Id. The Betz court further noted that some of the uncer-
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Betz court found that the Bardwell premise regarding the inadmissibility
of fraud in the inducement was not sound.70 In addition, Judge Weis
noted that both the Second Restatement of Contracts 71 and scholarly
commentary 72 support the proposition that evidence of fraudulent inducement may be introduced to "avoid an alleged contract." 73 Accordingly, the court concluded 74 that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
tainty in Pennsylvania cases may have been caused by a failure to distinguish
between a fraud action for damages or rescission and a breach of contract
action involving representations short of fraud. Id. at 407.
70. Id. at 407. The Third Circuit pointed out that Bardwell's reliance
on Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Kline was misplaced because Phillips did not
exclude evidence of fraudulent inducement, but rather held that the statements
in question did not amount to fraud. Id., citing Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v.
Kline, 368 Pa. 516, 84 A.2d 301 (1951).
Furthermore, the court also suggested that Bardwell's reliance on Phillips evidenced the court's failure to
distinguish between cases where a misstatement, though not technically fraudulent, was properly excluded in a breach of contract action, and those cases
where the misstatements did amount to fraud and the suit was for rescission.
647 F.2d at 407. For a discussion of Phillips, see note 23 supra. Judge Weis
proceeded to criticize Bardwell for its conclusion that one could not circumvent the parol evidence rule by bringing an action for fraud instead of breach
of contract. 647 F.2d at 407. Citing Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris with
disapproval, the court stated "that it surely would not be desirable to allow
a wrongdoer to evade responsibility by incorporating in a writing a boilerplate
integration clause disclaiming his fraudulent representations."
Id., citing
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 157 N.E.2d 597, 184 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1959). For a discussion of Danann, see note 53 supra.
71. 647 F.2d at 407.
Observing that the resolution of parol evidence
issues in Pennsylvania cases varied depending upon the nature of the action
the Third Circuit stated that there was no case law that provided a conclusive answer to the issue raised in Betz. Id. Thus, it turned to the Second
Restatement of Contracts, a source upon which, according to the court, Pennsylvania courts often relied, for guidance. Id. The court quoted the following
excerpt from the Restatement:
"Agreements and negotions prior to or contemporaneous with the
adoption of a writing are admissible in evidence to establish . . .
(d) illegality, fraud, duress, mistake, lack of consideration or other
invalidating cause." Comment c to that section states:
"Invalidating cause. What appears to be a complete and
integrated agreement may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an
agreement without consideration, or it may be voidable for fraud,
duress, mistake, or the like, or it may be illegal. Such invalidating causes need not and commonly do not appear on the
face of the writing. They are not affected even by a 'merger'
clause."

Id., quoting

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs,

Tent. Drafts Nos.

1-7, at

551 (1973).
The court then stated that the Berger line of cases was consistent with the Restatement. 647 F.2d at 408.
72. Id., citing 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACS § 580 at 435 (1960);
J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRAcrs 108 (2d rev. ed. 1974); 4 S. WILLISTON,
WILLISTON ON CONTRAcrs §§ 631 at 950, 634 at 1017 (3d ed. 1961); Sweet,
Promisory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL. L. REV. 877, 887 (1961);
Murray, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Clarification, 4 Duq. L. REV. 337 (1966).
73. 647 F.2d at 408 (footnote omitted).
74. Id.
Prior to this, the court set forth the policy arguments for the
Bardwell approach: insuring contracting parties of security in their transactions
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would hold that evidence of fraud in the inducement is not within the
parol evidence rule 75 and that the district judge erred in granting summar)' judgment.76
It is submitted that although the Third Circuit's reversal of the
district court's entry of summary judgment was appropriate, its rationale
was marred by the court's inadequate treatment of Pennsylvania law.
Of the two interests at stake in Betz 77-the interest in preserving certainty in contractual relations and the interest in preventing individuals
from immunizing themselves from their own fraud-the Third Circuit
deferred to the latter in its estimation of how the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would resolve the uncertainties in Pennsylvania law.7 8 In following the dictates of the Second Restatement of Contracts and various
commentators,7 9 the court overlooked a recent superior court case,
LeDonne v. Kessler,80 which provided not only a method of balancing
the competing interests at stake, but also a workable interpretation of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law.
with each other; reducing litigation, and removing the temptation to commit
perjury. Id. The court then highlighted the opposing interest of preventing
a party from using language to shield himself from "the consequences of his
own fraud." Id.
75. Id. The court found that when fraud was alleged, the interest in preventing a party from immunizing himself from his own fraud prevailed. Id.
76. Id. Since the district court's order was grounded on the premise that

Betz would be barred from presenting evidence of Cabot's alleged misrepresentations, the court concluded that the grant of summary judgment was
improper. Id.
77. See note 74 supra.
78. 647 F.2d at 408. It should be noted that the principal criticism of
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harriswas that the interest in preserving certainty in
contractual relationships prevailed over the opposing interest. See Gilbride,
supra note 53, at 271-72.
79. See notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text supra.
80. For a discussion of LeDonne, see notes 48-52 and accompanying text
supra. The Third Circuit summarily dismissed the LeDonne opinion as a
"questionable success" in harmonizing Pennsylvania case law. 647 F.2d at 406.
Under the Supreme Court case of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, a circuit
court, faced with the situation where the supreme court of the state whose law
it was applying had not addressed the issue, is not bound by a state's intermediate appellate court ruling, "where it has other persuasive data that the
highest state court would hold otherwise." 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). The
Third Circuit, without stating when or whether a federal appellate court is
bound by a state intermediate appellate court decision, has listed the kinds of
authority which can provide guidance for a circuit court. See Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 283-84 (3d Cir. 1980).
It cited, inter alia, decisions of intermediate appellate courts as well as scholarly
treatises, and the Restatements of Law. Id. See also McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 661 (3d Cir. 1980). For scholarly treatment of
this issue, see IA pt. 2 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309 (2d ed.
1979); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (3d ed. 1976). Thus while
the Third Circuit in Betz was apparently not bound by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court's decision in LeDonne, it is suggested that the Betz court should
have given it at least as much weight as it gave the Restatement of Contracts
and various scholarly commentaries. For the court's treatment of the Restatement and the scholarly commentaries, see note 72 supra.
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In setting forth a balancing test, the LeDonne court impliedly suggested a case-by-case approach to the question of whether evidence of
fraud should be introduced when the parties have included a merger
clause in their written agreement. 8' The advantage of this approach is
that it takes cognizance of the purpose of the parol evidence rule, the
preservation of the integrity of written contracts, 8 2 by allowing for the
possibility that a court could find, as a matter of law, that there was no
justifiable reliance and hence no fraud to render extrinsic evidence admissible.8 8 In addition, the LeDonne test accommodates the strong
policy interest in discouraging the use of contractual language to immunize a party from the consequences of his fraud, when under the
facts alleged, there are sufficient allegations to support a finding of
84
justifiable reliance.
In formulating this balancing test, the LeDonne court also provided
a useful construction of Pennsylvania Supreme Court law with its reconciliation of Bardwell and Berger.85 The court's interpretation of Berger,
that its holding was limited to its facts, is particularly significant.8 6
Given the LeDonne court's interpretation of Berger, it is suggested that
the Third Circuit did in fact have Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent for making a case-by-case analysis, but chose to construe Berger
more broadly as stating a general rule that was in conflict with
87

Bardwell.

Had the Third Circuit in Betz recognized the soundness of the
LeDonne decision and applied its balancing test, it would nonetheless
have reached the conclusion that the misrepresentations were admissible.
The integration clause in the instant case, while disclaiming all representations, made no reference to the buyer's knowledge from a prior
inspection, 88 as did the clause in Berger.8 9 Balancing the generality of
the merger clause against the fact that a reasonable inspection would
have yielded no information on the building's floor strength, the court
would have inevitably concluded that Betz's reliance on Cabot's statements was justifiable. Finally, with this analysis of the sufficiency of the
fraud claim, the Third Circuit could then have properly decided that
81. 256 Pa. Super. Ct. at 293-94, 389 A.2d at 1130. Under the Betz hold-

ing, fraud in the inducement is always admissible, as the parol evidence rule
is not applicable. 647 F.2d at 407.
82. See note 27 supra.
83. See note 53 supra.
84. See 256 Pa. Super. Ct. at 293-94, 389 A.2d at 1130. LeDonne itself is
a prime example of a court's sensitivity to both interests because, given the
two different types of misrepresentations and the separate holdings for each,
both interests prevailed. See note 53 supra.
85. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
86. See id.
87. See notes 63 & 65 and accompanying text supra.

88. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
89. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
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fraud so vitiated the contract that the parol evidence rule was inapplicable, and the representations therefore admissible.
The impact of the Betz decision will vary with the forum selected
by future litigants. Until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court resolves the
issue, the Betz opinion will serve as persuasive authority for Pennsylvania
courts 9 and binding authority in federal district courts within the
Third Circuit.91 In either case, the application of the Third Circuit's
rigid rule that fraud in the inducement is always admissible to different
factual contexts will lead to results that are not sound. A court using
Betz as precedent in a case where a contract provision specifically disclaims reliance on those facts claimed to be misrepresented will defer to
the interest of preventing a party from shielding himself from the consequences of his own fraud. 92 In so doing, the court will neglect the
paramount interest underlying the parol evidence rule-the preservation
of the integrity of written contracts.
Judy Wait Antzis
90. See 1B J. MooRE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.402[l] (1st ed. 1965).
91. See 1A pt. 2 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.309 (2d ed.
1979).
92. 647 F.2d at 408.
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